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When attending a musical performance, audience members may feel closely re-
lated to the musicians and even collectively related to each other. They may also 
imagine profound connections to the composer. Some theorists argue that musi-
cians should feel what the composer may have felt, and transmit these feelings to 
the audience. In the third part of his treatise on the True art of playing keyboard 
instruments, C. P. E. Bach (1753) discusses sympathy in musical performance:
A musician cannot move others if he is not moved himself; therefore he 
necess arily needs to be able to induce in himself all emotions which he wants 
to arouse in his audience; he conveys his feelings to them, and thus moves 
them effectively to experience co-sensations [‘Mit-Empfindung’] (p. 122).1
As pointed out in this well-known statement, musical performers should re- 
experience the composer’s passions when he/she was writing the music. Accord-
ing to Bach, improvisations affect the audience in an even stronger way, since 
emotions can be transmitted more directly. In doing so, musicians arouse a range 
of various affects in a ‘continuously changing’ manner (p. 122). Veridical expe-
riences of these emotions, in contrast to Bach’s ideas, are an almost impossible 
goal for musicians to achieve, since they would need to feel the range of affects 
themselves while at the same time having to concentrate on the more physical 
and structural components of performing. Therefore, one could argue that musi-
cians act as if they are experiencing certain emotions, and audience members are 
moved in ways similar to their emotional involvement when watching actors in 
a theatre play. Bach further states that in addition to the sound of the music, ex-
pressive gestures are useful for conveying a musician’s intentions and emotions. 
The multimodal coupling of body movements and sound is indeed at the core of 
many present theories of music’s emotional impact.
From an audience’s perspective, the communicative transmission and 
 reception of emotions has often been equated with musical empathy. Stephen 
Davies (2011), for example, argues that listeners’ empathic responses to music 
are forms of ‘attentional emotional contagion’ (p. 144), which are based on mir-
roring processes: ‘sad music tends to make (some) listeners feel sad’ (p. 135). 
This idea seems somewhat contradictory, given that contagion is usually seen as 
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an automatic, unmediated process, while directing one’s attention requires some 
deliberate, conscious processing (see also Miu & Vuoskoski, this volume). In this 
regard, Jerrold Levinson (2011) postulates that empathic experiences of musical 
emotions may lead to forms of ‘imagined emotions’ which are related to the ones 
in the experienced ‘music’s persona’ (p. 327). While the potential imaginative 
nature of some emotions cannot be discussed here, Levinson’s concept goes be-
yond the mere contagiousness in empathic responses to music. By ascribing a 
‘persona’ to music, listeners may rather consciously attempt to take the perspec-
tive of this imagined subject – whatever the subject in music is supposed to be.
In this chapter, I will discuss how individual listeners grasp the musical per-
former’s expressive intentions, what role bodily response mechanisms play in 
these processes, and how empathy may enable and modulate the understanding 
of what is conveyed in a performance. In particular, I will underline the sig-
nificance of cognitive facets in the appreciation of music, which are, in turn, 
regarded as a veridical component of empathic responses that are not limited to 
emotional contagion. A new model of musical empathic interactions is proposed 
with  perception–action coupling – that is, the idea that perception and action pro-
cesses are fundamentally interconnected – at its heart. Since there are relatively 
few existing empirical studies about audience empathy, this chapter will take 
as a starting point consideration of components of empathy through discussion 
of original theories and research concepts that underlie empathic interactions 
in music. It will go on to review perception–action models of empathy prior to 
the proposal and discussion of a new model in the light of existing empirical 
findings. This critical and empirical review will inform an understanding of the 
ways in which audiences interact with music and performers. For the purposes of 
this chapter, audiences will be regarded in the broadest sense within the Western 
tradition, referring to one or more listeners in various settings engaging with live 
or recorded performances, thus accessing sound and/or visual stimuli depend-
ing on the context. For example, audiences may include individuals undertaking 
solitary listening to recorded music, shared listening and/or viewing of recorded 
performances with friends, or watching live performances in concerts or public 
venues. Audience members may include individuals with or without specialist 
training or expertise in music.
Components of empathy
In accordance with the ideas of Davies (2011) and Levinson (2011) as outlined 
above, most psychological accounts of empathy posit both automatic components 
of empathy, comprising contagion and mirroring, as well as more conscious com-
ponents such as taking the perspective of someone else (Bischof-Köhler, 2012; 
Walter, 2012). In addition to the ability of feeling spontaneously with another 
individual, there are thus conscious and deliberate facets of empathy. These in-
clude trying to understand others by imagining their situation and state of mind, 
constructing an internal model of their reasoning, and evaluating the various 
factors that may influence their current behaviour or affect display. A positive 
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consequence of the comprehensive concept of empathy is the possibility for 
indivi duals to deliberately try to understand others better and therefore even 
learn to be more empathic. Music in particular may train listeners ‘in social 
attuning and empathic relationships’ (Leman, 2007, p. 126). Contagion, on the 
other hand, is supposedly more strongly related to personality characteristics that 
are less susceptible for deliberate changes (for further discussion, see Walter, 
2012). Definitions of empathy should thus not be reduced to emotional contagion 
and mirroring, they should rather integrate the various subcomponents of empa-
thy, including cognitive facets (cf. Bischof-Köhler, 2012; Coplan, 2011). At the 
same time, definitions need to be adequately specific in order to leave the some-
what slippery terrain of a concept with a rather long history in philosophy and 
psychology. Only with clear definitions of the subcomponents of empathy, valid 
hypotheses can be formulated and results be compared across different studies.
In 1980, Mark Davis developed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), one 
of the empathy inventories most widely employed in general psychology and 
many music-related studies. The first subscale ‘Perspective taking’ assesses the 
degree to which individuals ‘spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view 
of others’ (Davis, 1983, p. 113). The ‘Fantasy’ subscale measures the personal 
transposing into fictitious characters such as those in films or books, and to some 
degree appears to be related to Levinson’s (2011) imagined emotions. The two 
other subscales, ‘Empathic concern’ and ‘Personal distress’ assess emotional 
components when feeling or interacting with others. In sum, Davis (1983) laid 
stress on a multifaceted nature of empathy that included both the cognitive com-
ponent of perspective-taking as well as emotional components. These facets of 
empathy have ever since been debated and refined in numerous studies across 
various fields of research (see, for example, Coplan & Goldie, 2011). As a side 
effect of the definition debates and refinements of components in past decades, 
researchers may have concentrated less on explaining the underlying psycho-
logical processes and behavioural consequences. Early approaches and current 
theories provide such an explanation, by grounding empathy in bodily response 
circuits. In the next sections, I will describe early accounts of empathy that influ-
enced more recent theories, albeit some of the original concepts seem not always 
adequately rendered in some papers (see also Laurence, this volume, for further 
discussion of early conceptualisations of empathy).
Perception–action models of empathy
The introduction of the concept of empathy, a neologism based on a translation of 
the term ‘Einfühlung’ (feeling-into), dates back to the second half of the  nineteenth 
century. This period was characterised by the so-called psychologi cal turn in aes-
thetics and the history of arts (cf. Büttner, 2003), in addition to the deve lopment 
of empirical methods in philosophy and early psychological research. Friedrich 
Theodor Vischer emphasised the importance of the perceiving subject over the 
discussion of normative qualities of art works that, up to then, rested at the core 
of academic aesthetics. According to Vischer, individuals attribute psychological 
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qualities to the objects they perceive, which lead to impressions of inner co- 
experiences. His son, Robert Vischer, developed the theory of an inner ‘Me’ in 
his dissertation On optical feeling of form (1872). The Me transports itself into 
an object and empathises with it – a process he termed  ‘Einfühlung’. Influenced 
by Wilhelm Wundt, Vischer argued that the direct sensory and motor impulses 
evoked by perceptions may in turn cause positive or negative reactions in the 
observer. It is remarkable that Vischer employed a physiological–psychological 
evaluation circuit, thus highlighting bodily components in the perception of art, 
which is also a key principle of feeling-into.
As a psychological explanation for the appreciation of visual art and archi-
tecture, the concept of feeling-into inspired many theorists and artists of that 
epoch, especially those affiliated with expressionism (Wölfflin, 1886; see also 
 Mallgrave & Ikonomou, 1994). Some art historians, on the other hand, criticised 
the shortcomings of the new psychological explanations, since they would not suf-
ficiently account for the historical context in which art was created and perceived 
 (see Büttner, 2003). Philosophers, including Edmund Husserl (1900/1901) and 
Edith Stein (1917), employed and developed further the concept of feeling-into, 
which soon became a key concept in philosophical thinking of that time. It should 
not be ignored that philosophers of the centuries before had explored facets of em-
pathic behaviour in humans by the related term ‘sympathy’. For instance, David 
Hume (1793), in his Treatise of human nature, describes sympathy between people 
as a type of communication of emotions. The ability to perceive these emotions 
influences aesthetic responses and ethical behaviour (cf. Coplan & Goldie, 2011).
For current definitions of empathy, however, the work of Theodor Lipps, 
a philo sopher and (theoretical) psychologist around the beginning of the last 
century, was crucial. His ideas are often presented in a very condensed form 
and therefore merit detailed attention. Lipps is attributed to first describing the 
phenomenon of empathy in a systematic way (1903). His attempts to explain the 
underlying processes show striking parallels to modern theories of empathy (for 
example, Preston & de Waal, 2002, see below). In short, he proposed that ob-
serving someone else results in an inner strive or urge to move, which is particu-
larly pertinent when perceiving affect displays of other people. As a philosopher 
specialising in aesthetics, Lipps was also influenced by the discoveries made in 
the first experimental studies of perception carried out by Wundt and Hermann 
von Helmholtz. Although not employing experimental approaches himself, he at-
tempted to systematise human interactions and emotional responses on the basis 
of observable perceptual processes.
In the early monograph Foundations of psychology (‘Grundtatsachen des 
Seelenlebens’, 1883), he laid the foundation for the concept of inner co-sensations 
when interacting with others. The closer we feel to others, the more ‘we mirror 
and re-experience their life in ours, the more we must feel with and for them…’ 
(p. 687). Understanding other people, according to this view, is deeply grounded 
in realising the inner sensations that are evoked by perceiving others, and by 
projecting some of one’s own feelings onto other people. Twenty years later, in 
Foundations of aesthetics (‘Grundlegung der Ästhetik’, 1903) he formulates 
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further that the other is an imagined and ‘modified own Me’ (p. 106), perceived 
by visual and auditory gestures and facial expressions. Although this radical ap-
proach may resonate with later theories of symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934) 
and constructionism, it is the underlying process that is of particular interest 
here. Lipps suggests that nearly all utterances of life bear some expressive com-
ponents, either as direct affective utterances or more indirectly in the way people 
move when being in different moods. In this regard, auditory affective sounds 
(‘Affektlaute’, Lipps, 1903, p. 106) may also evoke a feeling with others:
When I hear a sound that is similar to the one I use for expressing this af-
fect myself, so I find myself – not connected, but directly in this affect. … 
I do not merely grasp the concept that the affect has caused the sound, but 
I experience the affect. I co-perform it internally … I am inclined to jubi-
late with the jubilating person. We will name this concept … feeling-into 
[‘Einfühlung’].
(Lipps, 1903, pp. 106–107)
According to Lipps, ‘feeling-into’ someone else is a direct process that is based 
both on the close perception of other people as well as on own experiences with 
certain affect displays. People are only able to co-perform affective behaviours in-
ternally if this behaviour is grounded in their own nature. The joy of co- performing, 
without being distracted by any other thoughts or interests, is called ‘positive 
 feeling-into’ (p. 110), which for Lipps is an explanation for someone’s enjoyment of 
watching other people move. Negative feeling-into may arise when observing, for 
example, haughty affect displays that resonate with the observer but evoke unpleas-
ant feelings. The positive process of feeling-into, leading to the wish of internally 
co- performing the movements, is seen as the ‘basis for aesthetic understanding’ 
(p. 120) of artistic movements such as those of an acrobat dancing on a rope.
Lipps argues that people strive for a ‘kinaesthetic image of the movement’ (p. 120) 
that matches the visually perceived optical image. While this kinaesthetic image is 
based on ‘certain processes in our muscles and fibres’ (p. 114), Lipps emphasises 
that ‘aesthetic feeling-into’ is an inner process that should neither be confounded 
with conscious acts of imitation nor with direct bodily sensations. Although he re-
peatedly refers to the resonance in the observer’s body, his theory can thus not fully 
explain the interactions between the physiological and psychological processes of 
feeling-into. When seeing an acrobat, people do not directly experience any bodily 
pressures or other physiological reactions but rather feel the urge for ‘inner activi-
ties’ (p. 130). In other words, people do not merely strive for own peripheral sensa-
tions but attempt to instinctively grasp another person’s state of mind:
The actual content of my aesthetic feeling-into is the entire inner state or 
manner of the inner behaviour, from which emerge the individual acts of will 
and action. Or, in short: it is the personality that I experience sympatheti-
cally in the perceived.
(Lipps, 1903, p. 132)
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In this regard, Lipps employs the terms identification and sympathy to illustrate 
facets of positive ‘feeling-into’. These processes are described as instinctive 
mechanisms that allow people to co-experience the ‘inner behaviour’ (p. 134) of 
others. It should be noted that researchers did not follow Lipps in using empathy 
and sympathy in almost synonymic ways. Empathy is seen as a more compre-
hensive concept that does not only encompass shared feelings with others (as 
for sympathy), but also includes taking the perspective of others (see, for exam-
ple, Coplan, 2011). Lipps noted that familiarity and experiences with a range of 
different emotions, the corresponding affect displays and emotional movements 
shape the way people can feel into others. The experience of motion-like qualities 
is not limited to bodily movements of other people, since even optical ‘shapes af-
ford movement possibilities’ (p. 144). In accordance with earlier ideas formulated 
by Vischer (1872), Lipps (1903) thus presents an explanation for the aesthetic 
pleasure that these shapes may offer in a different domain of art.
Taken together, Lipps proposed a theory of inner co-experiences with affect 
displays of other people that is based on bodily resonance. While the underly-
ing mechanisms are not described in detail and the recurrence to philosophical 
terms such as ‘will’ or ‘urge’ may not offer sufficient psychological explanations, 
he provided the ground for further efforts to elucidate human interactions and 
empathic responses. Lipps did not explicitly apply his concept to the experience 
of musical performances, which is surprising given the high frequency of musi-
cal examples he employed in his various other writings, which directly address 
musical themes, such as harmony (Lipps, 1885). Although he introduces the con-
cept of feeling-into with examples of affective sounds (see above), Lipps primar-
ily refers to visual perception in revisions of his concept. Recently,  researchers 
may have slightly misinterpreted Lipps in overemphasising the direct bodily 
component in his theory, for instance when stating that his ideas refer to ‘inner 
imitation or inner resonance that is based on a natural instinct and causes us 
to imitate the movements and expressions we perceive in physical and social 
objects’ (Coplan & Goldie, 2011, p. xii). Instead, Lipps’s ‘inner activities’ do 
not seem to cause direct movements in observers but rather aim at experiencing 
facets of someone else’s personality. The ‘fusion’ with another individual or ob-
ject, nevertheless, has been criticised by Husserl (1900/1901) and Stein (1917), 
who argued that intersubjective reasoning relies more on conscious self–other 
distinctions (see  Coplan & Goldie, 2011). Indeed, even acts of sympathy with 
others depend on a clear percept of another person, which helps to explain why 
more recent accounts of empathy highlight the component of perspective- taking. 
Lipps, neverthe less,  attempted to provide an aesthetic theory of perception, 
which should primarily explain the aesthetic appreciation of the world rather 
than explaining ethical behaviour. In the following, I will describe a more recent 
theory of empathy that partially reflects Lipps’s original ideas, and that can be 
applied to the domain of music performance and appreciation.
Stephanie Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal (2002) refer to Lipps’s concept 
of feeling-into as a bodily response mechanism of empathy in human and non- 
human primates. Perceiving actions or states of other people should activate 
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representations that correspond with the observed actions or states of others. In 
turn, these representations may automatically trigger various bodily reactions 
such as changes in heart rate or other autonomic and somatic responses. By 
‘representation’, Preston and de Waal (p. 54) do not refer to specified cogni-
tive or symbolic contents but simply to general information storage systems. 
When comparing the proposed mechanism with the original concept of Lipps 
(1903), it becomes evident that they laid more stress on the body component, 
since Lipps emphasised the inner strives and urges rather than the direct phys-
iological responses. Given Lipps’s focus both on internal, non- physiological 
processes and on the all-embracing idea of grasping another indivi dual’s 
personality, feeling-into may only partially be regarded as a precursor of 
perception–action models.
The idea of linking perception and action, on the other hand, can be traced back 
to early ideomotor accounts of human behaviour (Lotze, 1852; Sperry, 1952). 
More recently, Wolfgang Prinz and colleagues provided behavioural evidence for 
perception–action couplings, culminating in the formulation of Common coding 
theory (Prinz, 1997), which postulates that the perception of movements and 
the potential execution of these movements share mutual representations (‘com-
mon codes’) in the observer’s brain. As a consequence, motor familiarity with 
perceived actions should increase the internal responses and shape subsequent 
behaviour (cf. Wöllner & Cañal Bruland, 2010). Perception–action coupling is 
an automatic process that does not depend on conscious processing but requires 
some degree of attending to another individual’s state or actions. The discovery 
of mirror neurons has been attributed to provide neurophysiological evidence for 
the link between perception and action (for a review, see Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010) and for the automatic, unconscious co-experience of others’ emotions via 
internal simulation and imitation (cf. Decety & Ickes, 2009; Iacoboni, 2009).
According to Preston and de Waal’s (2002) theory, empathic responses are 
based on these coupling mechanisms: perceiving someone move in a  certain 
mood should resonate with the observer’s own action representations and 
may lead to physiological responses. It should be noted that the link between 
 perception– action systems and emotional responses remains rather elusive, since 
the type of physiological arousal is not specified and could be attributed to pos-
itive or negative emotions. Other researchers, nevertheless, indicate that inter-
nal simulation of others’ actions could indeed be related to empathic emotional 
responses (Gallese, 2007; Gallese, Ferrari, & Umiltà, 2002; Molnar-Szakacs & 
Overy, 2006). On a neurophysiological level, the insula, connecting the limbic 
system with cortical areas associated with action representations, may have a fun-
damental role in this regard (Carr et al., 2003; Preston & Hofelich, 2012;  Walter, 
2012). A number of studies of empathy provided evidence that familiarity with 
someone else, as well as perceived similarity and salience of the observed actions 
or affect displays are likely to increase empathy (see Preston & de Waal, 2002). 
 Furthermore, the higher processing speed of unconscious perception– action cou-
pling facilitates interactions between individuals and may thus have benefits for 
social interactions in groups, which could be a basic function of empathy.
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A perception–action approach to musical empathic 
interactions
Can musical performances be seen as an arena in which social couplings are 
exercised, by feeling-into the performers and by sharing mutual feelings with 
other members of the audience? A model is proposed (see Figure 5.1) to repre-
sent the musical empathic interactions between audiences, performers and music. 
Following embodied cognition approaches (cf. Leman, 2007),  perception– action 
coupling lies at the heart of the model because it is central to (1) the social dimen-
sions of empathy, including the more conscious perspective-taking, established 
through  Audience inter actions with Performers, (2) to co-performer empathy 
and feelings of agency, established through interactions between Performers 
and  Music, as well as (3)  attributions of a persona in music (Levinson, 2011), 
established through Audience interactions with Music. The model therefore re-
flects the ways in which audiences interact empathically with music (as a subject) 
and performers (as subjects) alongside the interactions between co-performers 
themselves.
Discussion about the role of perception–action coupling in musical empathic 
responses is given below according to a number of existing studies of joint ac-
tions between musicians in ensembles as well as between performers and au-
dience members. Further evidence stems from audience research addressing 
audio–visual ‘feeling-into’ the performers in the domains of music and dance. 
Most of these studies correlated subscales or overall scores of empathy invento-
ries with scores in experimental tasks.
In one of these tasks, jazz musicians, as expert listeners, were asked to in-
dicate the perceived spontaneity of piano jazz recordings (Engel & Keller, 
2011). Some of the melodies presented to them were improvised, while others 
were imitated. The overall differentiation accuracy was above chance (55 per 
cent correct). Indivi duals scoring higher on perspective-taking were better 
at differentiating between the two types of recordings. Although the expert 
Figure 5.1 Proposed model of musical empathic interactions.
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listeners of this study did not perceive the pianists’ actions visually, nuances 
in the sound outcome of the performed actions sufficed for the detection of 
subtle differences, which was modulated by the cognitive components of em-
pathy. When playing in an ensemble, skilled jazz musicians should also be 
able to respond to each other’s improvisations and changes in timing. In a 
qualitative observational study, ‘empathetic attunement’ was seen as being 
crucial for such successful and spontaneous interactions between jazz musi-
cians  (Seddon, 2005, p. 56).
Undoubtedly, these empathic interactions between musicians should be 
manifest in neural activations of certain brain regions. Evidence for em-
pathic perceptual effects of self-produced actions was provided in an electro-
encephalogram (EEG) study with jazz ensembles (Babiloni et al., 2012; see 
also Babiloni et al., this volume). The musicians’ brain activation patterns 
were measured during the actual performance and while they viewed their 
own performances subsequently. In the observation condition, musicians with 
higher empathy scores showed activations in a right frontal region (alpha de-
synchronisation in Brodmann area 44/45). Since these activations were not 
present in non-musicians, the authors concluded that they are related to the 
empathetic attunement (to use Seddon’s term) of expert musicians when ob-
serving their ensemble play and when interacting with others. A further study 
employed a musical duo paradigm to investigate empathy in relation to action 
representations of the complementary part of the music. Giacomo Novembre, 
Luca Ticini, Simone Schütz-Bosbach and Peter Keller (2012) asked amateur 
pianists to play the melodic lines of several Bach chorales in the right hand. In 
some conditions, a computer played back the bass line, while in others, no bass 
line was provided. The pianists were made to  believe that the complementary 
left-hand part, if presented, was played by an actual pianist  behind a screen. 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the right motor cortex produced 
motor-evoked potentials for the left hand. These potentials were larger in con-
ditions in which the pianists believed that they played along with another pi-
anist. In addition, the cognitive perspective-taking scale from  Davis’s (1983) 
IRI correlated with increased motor-evoked potentials. The authors concluded 
that the social component of playing together was linked to empathy, which 
may facilitate action representations of others. Lipps’s (1903) idea of feel-
ing-into could thus hold true for cognitive response circuits.
In addition to studies of joint actions, researchers have addressed perception– 
action couplings that may underlie the emotional and empathic responses of 
audience members. If aesthetic appreciation of music is modulated by these 
processes, then empathy may have a role in the perception of a musical perfor-
mance. The musicians’ body movements provide hints about their expressive 
intentions, which, in turn, should be related to the musical sound outcome and 
could reso nate in the audience members’ bodily response systems. In a study 
based on Preston and de Waal’s (2002) perception–action model of empathy, 
a string quartet was filmed from two perspectives during the performance of 
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Vaughan Williams’s first string quartet in G minor (Wöllner, 2012). A par-
ticularly expressive part of the first movement (bars 48–97) was selected for 
further analysis. This part contained two sections as clearly marked in the orig-
inal scores, with the second one having homophonic passages and a crescendo 
over several bars. Videos of the performances were produced under visual-
only, auditory- only and audio–visual conditions, showing each member of the 
quartet individually. Some months after the performance, each member of the 
quartet judged continuously the level of expressiveness of themselves and their 
fellow performers. Auditory and visual grand average judgements were cor-
related, indicating that the musicians perceived strong parallels between their 
bodily performance movements and the music in terms of expressiveness. Inde-
pendent observers were then asked to judge the performance under multimodal 
conditions, and difference values between the quartet’s own average ratings 
and each observer’s rating were calculated. For the second section of the music, 
empathy modulated judgements: that is, observers with higher affective empa-
thy could better decipher the quartet’s visual expressive intentions. Similarly, 
these observers’ visual judgements matched the quartet’s expressive intentions 
of the music more closely. In other words, the more empathic the observers 
were, the better they picked up the musicians’ intentions as indicated by them-
selves in the previous judgements, and empathy did affect the perception of a 
musical performance.
A further study tackled the question of whether or not empathy is related 
to judgements of auditory cues derived from social versus non-social situa-
tions. In a study with jazz duets, Ana Pesquita, Timothy Corlis and James Enns 
(2014) asked musically trained participants and novices to indicate whether dif-
ferent jazz standards were recorded in live conditions, meaning that the two 
musicians played along with each other’s performances simultaneously, or in 
dubbed versions with pre-recorded studio tracks. Participants also filled in Si-
mon  Baron-Cohen’s (2002) Autism Quotient (AQ), a measure of social aptitude 
and, indirectly, of empathy. Results show that participants could differentiate 
between live and dubbed versions, yet differences in sensitivity measures (that 
is, the differences in ratings between live and dubbed versions) were observed 
between four ad-hoc groups of participants: musical novices with low social 
aptitude were not sensitive for the auditory differences between live and dubbed 
recordings, while novices with high social aptitude as well as musically trained 
participants (regardless of their aptitude) could successfully discriminate the 
recordings. This result was generally confirmed in a follow-up experiment that 
contrasted novices with musical experts from a school of music. For novices, 
the general AQ showed the highest correlations with judgement sensitivity, so 
people with high social aptitude could tell more reliably whether the musicians 
had performed simultaneously or not. Albeit not significant, absolute values 
in sensitivity measures were highest for ‘social novices’ and even higher than 
for the music groups.  Musical experts with lower social aptitude, in contrast, 
did not significantly differ in solving the task than those experts with higher 
aptitude values. Pesquita, Corlis and Enns (2014) observed that results of the 
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systemising subscale of Baron-Cohen (2002) correlated particularly strongly 
with musicians’ sensitivity to the social recording situation, leading them 
to conclude that musicians approached the given task differently by paying 
more attention to musical detail rather than ‘using their intuition about social 
 interactions’ (p. 182).
While musicians may indeed engage with musical tasks in a different way 
compared to non-musicians and focus their attention more on technical as-
pects, it still remains surprising that musical expertise did not influence find-
ings (compared to ‘social novices’), in contrast to the social aptitude measures. 
 According to the explanations provided by perception–action accounts of em-
pathy, musicians should be able to internally feel nuances in joint live or dubbed 
performance situations. In other words, their experience with ensemble situa-
tions should allow for higher empathetic attunement. While Pesquita, Corlis 
and Enns (2014) indicate that only very few musicians had experiences as jazz 
musicians but all had ensemble experiences, they did not report their respective 
instruments. It might well be that the perception–action circuits are specific to 
the musicians’ action domains, and that guitarists or clarinettists would have 
been more sensitive in judging the auditory cues of their own instruments in 
the duets. Such action-specific effects on perceptual accuracy were shown in a 
study of string musicians that synchronised better with the entries of a first vi-
olinist, compared to musicians of other instruments or non-musicians (Wöllner 
& Cañal Bruland, 2010).
Further research, on the other hand, suggests that empathy does not in-
crease with musical training per se. Gunter Kreutz, Emery Schubert and Laura 
 Mitchell (2008) developed a music-specific empathising–systemising measure 
based on an earlier inventory by Baron-Cohen (2002). Sample questions in-
cluded (p. 72): ‘I think that I can easily sense how performers feel while playing 
music’  (musical empathising dimension) and ‘I especially like the  organised 
way that music is laid out’ (musical systematising dimension). Three subgroups 
established according to musical expertise (professional, amateur or no perfor-
mance experience) showed consistent differences in the systemising dimension 
but not in empathising. A follow-up study with a smaller sample and a con-
densed version of the questionnaire resulted in generally higher systemising as 
well as empathising scores in relation to musical expertise, although findings 
were less systematic than in the first study. Taken together, there is evidence 
that musicians develop specific cognitive styles in relation to their domain of 
experience that distinguishes them from others with no active experience in 
music performance. In a recent questionnaire study (Egermann & McAdams, 
2013), being musically  active was positively related to responses given to the 
question ‘Did you empathise with the musicians you just heard?’ (p. 144). 
 Considering the manifold social interactions that playing in musical ensem-
bles typically entail, influences on domain-specific forms of empathy should 
be  further investigated.
Besides potential effects of active musical experience, audience members’ 
empathic responses can to some extent be modulated even on a short-term basis. 
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Andrei Miu and Felicia Balteș (2012; see also Miu & Vuoskoski, this volume) 
found out that instructions on empathising with the performer influenced both 
the type of emotions perceived and the physiological reactions. While watch-
ing two commercial video tapes of Cecilia Bartoli, participants were instructed 
either to imagine ‘how the performer feels … and try to feel those emotions 
themselves’ or to ‘take an objective perspective toward what is described in the 
music, and try not to get caught up in how the performer might feel’ (p. 2; in-
structions adapted by van Lange, 2008). As a result, out of nine music-induced 
emotions from the  Geneva Emotional Music Scales (Zentner, Grandjean, & 
Scherer, 2008), ‘feelings of nostalgia’ and ‘power’ were higher in the empathis-
ing condition. For one piece of music, skin conductance decreased, while for the 
other piece, respiration rates increased, suggesting some evidence for relation-
ships with physiological arousal and the experimental instruction conditions. 
In self-judgements, most participants believed that the music rather than the 
performer’s facial expression or the lyrics were the cause of their attunements. 
 Although the impact of Bartoli’s expressive gestures on observers’ empathy can-
not be ruled out in the experimental design, the main finding suggests that peo-
ple can indeed consciously direct their levels of empathising with the musician 
by focusing on different aspects of the performance. In a follow-up study, ‘dis-
positional empathy’ – a concept somewhat debated, since empathy is generally 
not seen as a personality  characteristic – was related to feelings of sublimity and 
unease that was also expressed in a live performance of a Puccini opera (Balteș 
& Miu, 2014). Empathy may thus enhance the experience of musically expressed 
emotions. Interestingly, visual imagery skills were related to the feeling of the 
same emotions, providing some support for the impact of visually perceivable 
and imaginable movements.
These studies support early theories of feeling-into other people’s states when 
watching them move, or when hearing the corresponding sound outcome of the 
music they perform. More recent perception–action accounts of empathy fur-
ther elucidate the advantage musicians may have in observing subtle nuances in 
performances that resonate with their own action systems. Studies so far used 
questionnaire approaches or controlled individual experimental sessions. It re-
mains an open question as to whether the listening situation influences empathic 
responses. Since musical interactions are genuinely social experiences – whether 
real or with an imagined persona (see Levinson, 2011) – the social situation of 
listening and the co-presence of other audience members may further influence 
the ways people react empathically to music.
Aside from the evidence discussed above, music provides auditory and, in live 
performance contexts, also visual cues for actions that can lead to empathic re-
sponses. The perception–action theory of empathy should thus be valid for other 
performance domains that engender visual perceptions of actions (for a review, 
see Sevdalis & Raab, 2014). Perceiving a dancer move should resonate in the 
observers’ motor systems, and empathy may modulate responses in relation to 
the emotional content expressed. Comparable to the field of music, potential links 
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between extensive dance training and enhancements in empathic responses were 
investigated. In an early study, Kalliopuska (1989) observed that young  Finish 
ballet dancers aged nine to seventeen years had higher empathy scores compared 
to other students of the same age with no ballet training. She concludes that ballet 
dancers constantly train to express certain emotions, which would enhance their 
capacities for empathy.
Using a self–other paradigm, Vassilis Sevdalis and Peter Keller (2011) investi-
gated relations between empathy and accuracy in judging agency and expression. 
Point-light displays were created from ten individuals dancing to funk music 
either expressively or with less expression. About half a year later, the same 
participants watched the point-light videos showing them or other individuals. 
Participants with higher overall empathy scores (according to the Davis inven-
tory, 1980) were more accurate at indicating whether the point-light dancer had 
been them or someone else. In addition, participants were more successful at 
correctly indicating the intended expressiveness when they scored higher on the 
perspective-taking subscale. Taken together, participants were able to evaluate 
characteristics of human motion presented to them in very short films and with 
as little as thirteen body markers, which is in line with previous research showing 
that self–other distinctions are possible for information-rich motion such as free 
dancing (cf. Loula et al., 2005).
All participants in Sevdalis and Keller’s (2011) study had danced themselves, 
so one could expect some resonance in their action system when observing 
the point-light actions. Yet those with higher general empathy scores benefit-
ted more from these coupling processes. This finding raises the question as to 
whether empathy is indeed mainly grounded in perception–action couplings, or 
whether components of empathy enhance perceptions of oneself and others in 
a more abstract way. The first possibility would explain individual differences 
with regard to the training of these automatic coupling mechanisms. Individ-
uals who are highly experienced in performing certain actions would be more 
empathic when observing the same actions. The second explanation assumes 
more indirect empathy effects in action observation of others that may be re-
lated to general trait empathy beyond specific domains of expertise. In a related 
study, even observers not involved in the production of the dance movements 
were able to judge the level of expressiveness as intended by the dancers, and 
empathy values correlated again with judgement accuracy (Sevdalis & Keller, 
2012). Thus, there is tentative evidence that empathetic attunement to dance 
is not limited to a repertoire of actions and situations directly experienced by 
dancers.
Support for this claim stems from studies of individuals taking part in mu-
sical activities and tasks involving some form of synchronisation. These activ-
ities are supposed to enhance levels of general empathy and socially desirable 
behaviour beyond the specific domain or situational context. Compared to con-
trols, child ren with musical training scored higher in an empathy inventory 
(Hietolahti- Ansten & Kalliopuska, 1990), and show a significant increase in 
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empathy scores after a year of musical training (Rabinowitch, Cross, & Bur-
nard, 2013). Again, these results lead to the question as to whether musicians 
are indeed more empathic, perhaps by dealing with highly condensed emotions 
in music, and by synchronising their actions with others for a considerable 
time of their lives. To my knowledge, no large-scale study has reported higher 
general empathy scores in professional musicians (cf. Kreutz, Schubert, & 
Mitchell, 2008). This lack of data is worth considering in terms of what studies 
of pro-social outcomes share with other research on musical transfer effects, 
such as those addressing subcomponents of intelligence. One could argue that 
the effects in question are either rather short term and thus do not profoundly 
influence an individual’s way of responding to other people or objects, or even 
that the levels of professionalism in musicians may potentially limit pro-social 
effects in the world of music business.
Conclusions
Investigating empathy in relation to music performance and perception may offer 
deep insights into fundamental questions of why and how people engage with 
music. The increased research interest in music and empathy coincides to some 
extent with what one could call the ‘emotional turn’ in the psychology of music. 
A large body of research attributes the significance of music to its emotional 
impact on many people’s lives. For some researchers, feeling-into the perceived 
subject of the music – whether that is the performer, composer, or some abstract 
musical persona – and responding emotionally to the music defines the process 
of empathic behaviour. Those who feel the contagious influence of music more 
strongly should be particularly empathic.
There are limits to this view. Musicians may not constantly feel the variety 
of emotions they express musically and, equally, a listener will not necessarily 
be affected by all emotions a piece of music may embody. Music itself should 
not be reduced to its emotional impact (Langer, 1941), since it offers a number 
of important further experiences, among them the structuring of time, enabling 
perceptions of space and leading to numerous associations, or linking the past 
with the present. These experiences may coincide with emotions, yet often their 
experiential significance for a listener may not primarily depend on emotional 
loadings. Analytic listeners focusing on the musical structure at one extreme, or 
people hearing music with less attention in the background on the other, typically 
remain emotionally rather detached. Should they be less empathic than others? 
My argument here is that responses to music should not be equated with emo-
tional contagion, since such a perspective would limit the plurality of possible 
aesthetic experiences.
In a similar vein, empathy should not be reduced to emotional contagion. A 
broader view was expressed in original theorising, philosophical accounts and 
psychological theory: empathy includes both low-level automatic components, 
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such as contagion, and higher-level conscious processes, such as perspective- 
taking, the latter showing some similarities to Theory of Mind (Walter, 2012; 
cf. Livingstone & Thompson, 2009), which is also addressed in  Baron-Cohen’s 
(2002) Autism Quotient. Only if cognitive elements are involved, then a full 
understanding of musical interactions and engagement can be reached. In this 
regard, Martha Nussbaum (2001) distinguishes empathy from ‘compassion’ by 
stating that ‘empathy is simply an imaginative reconstruction of another per-
son’s experience, whether that experience is happy or sad, pleasant or painful 
or neutral’ (p. 302). It should be noted that a number of the studies discussed 
above resulted in correlations with cognitive  perspective-taking (Engel & 
Keller, 2011; Novembre et al., 2012; Sevdalis & Keller, 2011), thus support-
ing the argument for comprehensive research on musical empathy.  Assuming 
a perception– action basis for empathy – such as formulated to some extent 
by Lipps (1903) and more recently by others as discussed above –  provides a 
meaningful and fruitful way to see empathy as an important facet of social 
experiences, grounded in bodily processes and potentially leading to a deeper 
understanding of each other.
Do individuals’ general levels of empathy explain their responsiveness to 
music and other forms of art? If so, then listeners who enjoy feeling with other 
people and taking their views to a greater extent should also appreciate per-
forming arts more than others. Some researchers have recently argued for a 
genetic component of empathy (for a review, see Walter, 2012), suggesting 
that individual differences in empathic behaviour are indeed more stable than 
previously thought. These differences may shape the susceptibility to musical 
emotions (Vuoskoski et al., 2012). In other studies, researchers suppose that 
empathy can be enhanced, and call for ‘empathy education’ (Rabinowitch, 
Cross, & Burnard, 2013, p. 494; cf. Leman, 2007), which may result in specific 
music programmes for children. The consistent finding that women appear to be 
more empathic than men (Egermann & McAdams, 2013; Kreutz, Schubert, & 
 Mitchell, 2008; for a review, see Sevdalis & Raab, 2014) could be both attri-
buted to genetic differences as well as cultural influences. Therefore it is still 
not clear in what ways empathy may be modulated by musical involvement as 
a listener or performer. Based on perception–action accounts of empathy, how-
ever, there is tentative evidence that sustained training in social interactions – 
a key component of music performance – should result in fine-tuned skills when 
responding to others and imagining their thoughts and feelings. If such ac-
counts are based on joint actions, is it also possible that empathy is enhanced in 
performing musicians, such as pianists, who are practising and performing pri-
marily alone, and audience members who enjoy solitary listening? A potential 
explanation may lie in the imagination of a person (composer) or a persona in 
the music (Bach, 1753; Levinson, 2011). In this way, musicians playing solo as 
well as individual audience members may imagine their activity as being some 
form of social interaction.
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Note
 1 Translated by the author, as for all other translations from the German.
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